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Introduction 
Software is the foundational building material for the engineering of the Department 
of Defense (DoD) systems—the principal means for delivering almost 100% of the 
integrated functionality of kinetic weapon systems. Software is also the means for creating 
warfighter competitive advantage in today’s net-centric warfare environment, where the flow 
of information in real time is critical to the execution of the DoD’s mission across all 
domains. There is no plateau in sight for the advancement of software technology and its 
extensive use by the DoD in new systems, as well as to enhance the capabilities of legacy 
systems and extend their operational value far beyond their designed service life.  
To maintain its competitive edge, it is imperative that the DoD have the capability 
and capacity to affordably acquire and sustain software-reliant systems to continually 
operate and achieve mission success in a dynamic threat, cyber, and net-centric 
environment. However, the DoD is strategically challenged to produce high-quality software 
more affordably and efficiently across the system lifecycle, as noted by the Defense Science 
Board (2000) and others (National Research Council [NRC], 2010a). The acquisition and 
sustainment of software, particularly for distributed real-time and embedded systems, 
remains high risk and more problematic as individual system and system-of-systems 
complexity continues to grow.  
As long recognized, successful acquisition of software-intensive systems by the DoD 
is driven to a significant degree by the competencies of the DoD’s organic software 
engineering workforce in applying evidence-based knowledge and practice throughout a 
- 455 - 
system’s lifecycle (Software Engineering Institute [SEI], 1998). In a prior study, we 
emphasized the need to better address software sustainment issues, particularly by 
engaging appropriate software expertise at the right points early in the acquisition lifecycle, 
when critical engineering decisions are made (Shull & McLendon, 2017). This means that 
the DoD organic software engineering sustainment community must be an active participant 
early in the requirements and engineering process and that the product support manager in 
acquisition programs must be knowledgeable and proactive in representing software 
sustainment equities.  
Achieving this early engagement to influence software design-for-sustainability 
requires DoD organic software engineering staff who are not just knowledgeable about 
software but also “street-smart” in system acquisition. Many DoD sustainment programs with 
which we have interacted over the last few years have been separately developing software 
workforce competencies to enable effective engagement early in the acquisition process.  
In this paper, we synthesize what we have learned to date regarding an initial model 
to assist the DoD in thinking about DoD software engineering competencies. We emphasize 
that this is an initial model recognizing that defining workforce competencies is complex and 
also dynamic given the nature of software and system sustainment policies.  
Research Goal, Scope, and Methodology 
Our research goal was to characterize the state of the practice regarding the DoD’s 
software sustainment workforce with respect to the range of roles and related skills required, 
from which an initial model of the relevant competencies could be created. We also captured 
some of the recurring challenges related to workforce issues and the role of contractor 
versus the DoD organic software sustainment workforce in addressing those challenges. 
This work was conducted in the context of ongoing work focused on software 
sustainment in weapons systems; therefore, the direct applicability of our results are limited 
to that domain. Software in this domain can typically be characterized as embedded 
software (i.e., software that interacts with physical components to provide functionality for 
the overall weapons system). Acquisition of embedded software presents some of the most 
technically difficult and resource-intensive software engineering challenges because of 
tightly coupled interfaces, integration with unique hardware, real-time requirements, and 
very high reliability and assurance needs due to life-critical and mission-critical demands. 
However, the DoD has a substantial amount of software across many other domains: 
business systems; mission support systems (e.g., test equipment, mission planning, 
engineering models, and simulations); mission-critical, non-embedded systems; and 
modeling and simulation, among others. While our initial results can be used to understand 
the software workforce issues for other types of software-intensive systems, a more detailed 
description of how to tailor results for those domains is a subject of future work.  
Our team leveraged multiple streams of data and information for this study. 
 Literature Search—The body of knowledge related to software engineering is 
extensive. However, there has been limited systematic study focused on DoD 
software sustainment; therefore, there is no organized set of literature and 
ongoing study or research agenda to create and refresh a software 
sustainment body of knowledge  
 SEI DoD Engagements—The SEI has been actively engaged with the military 
services for three decades to provide technical expertise to enhance 
organizational capabilities (processes, practices, and competencies) for 
- 456 - 
software engineering across the lifecycle and solve technical challenges for 
specific weapon system and information system programs.  
 Interviews With Key Leaders—The SEI complemented its research with 
information from meetings with key leaders across all four Services, including 
(1) those in the Senior Executive Service (SES), (2) senior managers and 
staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and (3) those from 
industry. This study was conducted at the unclassified level, and our 
interviews with DoD sustainment staff were conducted under the conditions of 
non-attribution to enable an open exchange of perspectives with senior 
leaders, managers, and staff engaged in software sustainment.  
Context: Workforce Issues in the Software Sustainment Ecosystem 
Results from our prior research indicate that the DoD’s software sustainment 
infrastructure is best described and understood as an ecosystem composed of interrelated 
elements. We found over and over that the factors that drive software sustainment are 
highly interrelated. For example, it is difficult to discuss the workforce needed to perform 
necessary sustainment activities without first understanding the business model in terms of 
public-private partnerships, which activities can be done by contractors, and which activities 
need to remain in the organic DoD workforce. Decisions about the nature and types of these 
business models may also be influenced by the degree to which the government has 
provisioned for and exercised its technical data rights for a given program at the time of 
developing an acquisition strategy and contract. These decisions have implications for the 
scope of the software sustainment system. Because of the high degree of connectivity that 
exists among the drivers and factors, we use the metaphor of an “ecosystem” to describe 
the interdependencies among these elements; decisions made at any point are affected by 
and affect whole series of other decisions. 
Based on our research, we created a framework that describes the software 
sustainment ecosystem, depicted in Figure 1. We abstracted the issues raised in our 
discussions with DoD sustainment stakeholders into six demand drivers and 10 ecosystem 
elements, which were described more fully in a prior paper (Shull & McLendon, 2017).  
The six demand drivers, shown in the outer ring of Figure 1, represent requirements 
that are generated by changes in the weapon system’s mission profile, funding availability, 
evolution of the underlying technologies, and so forth. These drivers capture the fact that 
DoD systems exist in an environment that is highly dynamic, where there is a need to 
respond to constantly changing threats and mission needs. This dynamism drives many of 
the system changes that must be made during software sustainment. For many of these 
changes, the most cost-effective way of implementing the new capability relies on the 
unique flexibility of software. 
The 10 ecosystem elements, shown as interconnected “bubbles” in Figure 1, are the 
tightly interconnected factors that sustainment organizations must manage to effectively and 
continuously engineer the software. The drivers and elements of this ecosystem represent a 
virtual spider web of linkages and relationships.  
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Figure 1. The DoD Software Sustainment Ecosystem Framework  
Among these ecosystem elements, the three knowledge and expertise elements 
(shown in light orange in Figure 1) are most closely related to workforce skill sets. These 
elements include the factors that describe how the necessary skill sets are brought to bear 
for sustainment activities, and how the government grows its organic workforce and 
accesses necessary technical information—perhaps with some level of interaction with the 
private sector—to deliver and deploy the capabilities that must go to the warfighter. They 
consist of the following: 
 Workforce (Competency and Staffing)—The means of accessing a 
sufficient workforce with appropriate skill sets, as well as a balance of organic 
and non-organic staff 
 Business Model (Incentives, Workshare)—The strategic decision 
regarding which parts of the work will be done by the organic workforce and 
which by contractors, and how the overall work is managed both technically 
and contractually 
 Technical Data Rights and Licensing—The tactical decisions governing 
what technical information is necessary to be accessed by the organic 
workforce, and the mechanisms by which they have access and the ability to 
maintain their working knowledge 
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Historical Context of DoD’s Software Workforce 
Several DoD studies dating back to 1982 have raised concerns about the technical 
competencies and size of the DoD’s software workforce.1 The key threads from previous 
relevant studies are summarized below. We argue that the DoD today remains challenged 
to find the highly skilled systems and software engineers needed now and in the future.  
As early as 1993, the DoD Acquisition Management Board identified the need to 
review the DoD’s software acquisition management education and training curricula, which 
was the first attempt by the DoD to establish a set of software acquisition management key 
competencies for the acquisition workforce. At that time, no existing DoD workforce 
functional management group was responsible for identifying the software competencies 
needed in the workforce. The board asserted that no new career field was needed for 
software acquisition managers and also made a key assumption. The board assumed that 
some personnel in acquisition programs clearly require more knowledge of software 
development and acquisition management than others, and that within each program there 
was an experienced individual fulfilling that role.  
By 2001, the same concerns regarding the software competencies of the DoD 
acquisition work-force surfaced again. The DoD Software Intensive Systems Group, then in 
the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Science & Technology, conducted a 
software education and training survey of the acquisition workforce (SEI, 2017a). The 
findings from this study led to three specific recommendations: (1) Institute mandatory 
software-intensive systems training for the workforce, (2) develop a graduate-level program 
for software systems development and acquisition, and (3) require ACAT 1 programs to 
identify a chief software/systems architect.  
A year later in 2002, Congress mandated in the NDAA for fiscal year 2003 that the 
DoD establish a program to improve the software acquisition processes. Subsequently, 
each Service established a strategic software-improvement program (Army 2002, Air Force 
2004, and Navy 2006). These Service initiatives have continued at some level; however, 
with the sun setting of the Software Intensive Systems Group at the OSD level, the 
enterprise focus on software has waned.  
In 2006, the DoD once again recognized that the sound application of modern 
software technologies and the use of sound software engineering practices over the 
acquisition lifecycle was critical to program execution given the increasing reliance on 
software in DoD systems. As a result, the DoD sponsored an industrial base study (Chao, 
2006) to assess the nation’s software workforce. The study concluded that while the nation’s 
overall supply of software engineers may be adequate for the near term, there was a 
significant shortfall in the number of “top tier” software managers, architects, and domain 
experts. More importantly, the study estimated that perhaps as few as 500 engineers had 
the skills to develop the DoD’s complex, software-intensive systems. This study did not 
specifically address the DoD’s demand for government software engineers in acquisition 
                                            
 
 
1 Defense Joint Service Task Force Report on DoD Software Action Plans, 1982; Report of the 
Defense Board Report on Military Software, July 1987; Adapting Software Development Poli-cies to 
Modern Technology, Air Force Studies Board, National Research Council, 1989; DoD Information 
Systems Workforce Education, Training, and Career Development, Executive Re-sources Task Force 
Report, October 1992; DoD Software Master Plan, DAB S&T Committee, February 1990. 
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and sustainment, but as recognized by the DoD, it reported that these “shortfalls in top tier 
talent are evident there as well.” The National Defense Industrial Association echoed similar 
concerns about the need for software knowledge and skills in its 2008 Report on Systemic 
Root Cause Analysis of Program Failures.2 
During this same period, the Navy started the Software Process Improvement 
Initiative (SPII), which identified issues preventing software-intensive projects from meeting 
schedule, cost, and performance goals. This initiative highlighted the lack of adequately 
educated and trained software acquisition professionals and systems engineers. 
Subsequently, the Navy SPII Human Resources Focus Team recommended that the DoD 
use the findings from the Navy’s report as a baseline to analyze the software competencies 
of the acquisition workforce.  
As the result of this focus on the software workforce, the OSD issued guidance to 
create the Software Acquisition Training & Education Working Group (SATEWG) with a 
charter to affirm required software competencies, identify gaps in Defense Acquisition 
Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) career fields, and develop a plan to address those 
gaps. This group was composed of representatives from the Services, the OSD, and other 
organizations, including the SEI. The group developed a software competency framework 
that identified four key knowledge areas and 29 competencies that could inform the different 
acquisition workforce managers about the software competencies to be integrated into their 
existing career field competency models (Lucero, 2010). There has been no follow-on effort 
to evaluate the progress of the SATEWG or its outcomes. 
More recently, each Service, as well as at the software sustainment organizational 
level, has evolved its own approach or model for identifying software competencies for its 
workforce. For example, one model in the DoD is based on establishing a software 
competency based organization with skilled people, processes, tools, mission facilities, and 
core technologies to support program teams and other customer needs. This model is 
enabled by a standard skills package that provides a description of the unique competency 
skills and associated criteria necessary for individuals to gain certification at one of three 
levels. In this competency-based organizational model, software staff are assigned as 
appropriate to serve as members of a program office functional engineering team or a 
software sustainment organization. As of 2018, the DoD Information Technology (IT) 
Functional Integrated Product Team (FIPT) has responsibility for DoD software workforce 
competencies.  
This historical context highlights two key points. First, the DoD has long recognized 
the challenges of addressing the technical competencies and size of the software workforce 
across the lifecycle. However, there is limited evidence these different efforts had any 
lasting impact or resulted in meaningful outcomes. Second, this history clearly indicates that 
acquiring software human capital and equipping that workforce with the necessary 
competencies is a persistent and dynamic challenge that demands a continuous enterprise 
strategy. Our engagements with the DoD’s software-sustainment organization clearly 
demonstrate the strategic and practical challenges in dealing with these issues.  
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Challenges in the State of the Practice 
A key challenge today is that there is no visibility into the number of personnel in the 
DoD’s software sustainment organic workforce, and even less insight into the skills and 
background that they bring to their job. 
Figure 2 shows 2016 data (the most recent we could find) that identifies the DoD’s 
engineering workforce by occupational code and size as well as the number of personnel 
who are considered to be part of each acquisition engineering career field. (Those personnel 
engaged specifically in software sustainment represent a subset of these numbers.)  
From this view, the software workforce in the DoD, whether in acquisition programs 
or organic sustainment organizations, cannot be accounted for at the DoD or Service 
enterprise levels. It is also not clear if all engineers across the DoD engaged in software 
sustainment are known. Based on our interviews, the principal engineering occupational 
codes most represented in the software sustainment workforce are 0855, 0801, 1550, 0854, 
and 0850. However, a list of all government personnel in these codes does not capture all 
government personnel performing software engineering duties. 
  
Figure 2. DoD Engineering Workforce 
It is clear that the DoD’s software-sustainment organizations place a high priority on 
software human capital across the cycle of recruitment, retention, and training in what is a 
highly competitive market. Since the DoD organizations engaged in software work are 
distributed across the country, geographic constraints (i.e., locations in parts of the country 
without substantial commercial software industry) can be challenging. However, there are 
numerous examples of innovative DoD approaches to building relationships with colleges 
and universities to enhance recruiting and provide for continuing education.  
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Our engagements with software-sustainment stakeholders identified several 
challenges these organizations face in their ability to hire, develop, and retain the skills of 
this critical organic workforce. The most relevant of these challenges are highlighted below.  
 Each software-sustainment center is challenged by the fact that there can be 
great diversity in knowledge and understanding about software engineering 
among new hires. Such new hires come from different engineering disciplines 
and educational programs, where there may be limited emphasis on software 
engineering. As a result, there are often significant gaps in knowledge and 
practical skills. These gaps must be filled to enable a new hire to be 
productive in an organization that has standards, practices, and a defined 
software engineering lifecycle development process. During our study, we 
noted and confirmed with software engineering managers that entry-level 
engineers do not appear to have been exposed to secure coding practices or 
vulnerable code detection as part of their education or previous on-the-job 
experience. Further, these entry-level engineers tended to know about 
vulnerabilities in code but were not aware of how these vulnerabilities could 
be exploited, the impact of that exploitation, or how to detect and fix these 
vulnerabilities.  
There is a larger issue at hand regarding the diversity of knowledge and 
understanding of new hires coming into the DoD software-sustainment 
workforce. Cyber-physical systems (including weapons systems) pose 
exceptional technical challenges to systems and software engineering 
practitioners. Many software engineering academic programs emerged out of 
computer science- and math-focused programs, requiring little in the way of 
classical engineering courses in physics, electronics, chemistry, and 
mechanics. Systems engineering academic programs grew out of the 
classical engineering programs, requiring little in the way of software 
engineering competencies. As a result, systems and software engineering 
graduates are well prepared to work on computational systems, but fewer 
graduates are well prepared to work on cyber-physical systems (e.g., weapon 
systems). Further complicating this challenge is that those trained in 
computer science and those trained in software engineering have different 
skill sets.  
The root cause of this issue is beyond the ability of the DoD’s organic 
software engineering and sustainment organizations to solve. However, this 
issue highlights the significant challenge faced by software sustainment 
centers in filling the gap in terms of the practical competencies required for 
continuous engineering of software intensive systems. How to best and 
affordably fill this workforce competency gap is a DoD and Service enterprise 
challenge.  
 The number of different software languages and versions of those languages 
used in the DoD’s legacy systems is staggering and creates significant 
challenges in achieving and sustaining critical competencies. Within this 
diversity of programming languages, the use of the Ada language presents a 
critical challenge to the software-sustainment centers because Ada still 
represents a significant portion of the software code base in use within the 
DoD. This is problematic for the DoD across the workforce since Ada is no 
longer commonly taught or supported outside of legacy DoD applications. 
Thus, there is no college or university pipeline for training and education or 
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ongoing development of tools. Further, the DoD is no longer the driver of the 
technology marketplace as it was decades ago, so it has limited ability to 
influence the selection of programming language within the supply chain.  
The graph in Figure 3 highlights this point. This data is taken from a snapshot 
of DoD software data that has been collected from certain programs and 
analyzed by the SEI (2017b). By far, the C family of programming languages 
dominates in terms of the software in DoD systems. (The C family includes C, 
ANSI C, C++, C#, C/Assembly, and C# Net languages.) Ada represents 
another substantial subset and, therefore, will continue to be a challenge.  
 
Figure 3. Distribution of Software Languages  
 Managing the dynamics of an aging workforce in the DoD is not unique to the 
software-sustainment workforce. However, our view is that this fact-of-life 
issue for the sustainment community may be exacerbated by several factors. 
The DoD must continually make adjustments to accommodate a decline in 
the acquisition of new systems while the service life of legacy systems is 
extended in the force structure. This, in turn, creates a demand for the 
workforce to be continually refreshed in legacy system technical knowledge 
and skills. The software sustainment environment is inherently dynamic due 
to technology and mission demands, the evolving nature of program-by-
program decisions regarding public-private partnerships, and cyber demands. 
Finally, there is lead time associated with acquiring and training software 
human capital, which means it is critical to plan for the organic software-
sustainment workload as early as possible in the acquisition process.  
A challenge we heard repeatedly from all levels of organizational leadership 
and management was the slowness of the government hiring process. 
Analysis of the talent acquisition process was beyond the scope of this study, 
but those we interviewed cited many examples of this problem. In a 
competitive marketplace, interested recruits are unlikely to stay available for 
the weeks or months required for the DoD human resources process to 
complete. In our view, this behavior is out of sync with the tenets of the DoD’s 
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Better Buying Power policies, which emphasize imperatives such as greater 
productivity and efficiency. 
A Model for Analysis of Inherently Governmental Responsibilities and Needed 
Skills 
To facilitate DoD programs thinking through their software workforce issues, we 
propose that the DoD first focus on identifying critical organic engineering competencies 
needed for specific programs, domains, and technologies. The DoD should use this list of 
competencies to identify gaps in the current organic workforce and ensure that a pipeline of 
talent is constantly being recruited. What we mean by workforce pipeline is a mechanism by 
which junior personnel are explicitly mentored by senior personnel to avoid the risks that 
skill gaps open up when personnel leave the project for any reason. An important part of this 
analysis is understanding what skills must be established and maintained in a government 
software engineering organization for it to perform inherently organic software engineering 
functions. A key element in this analysis is determining the software engineering functions 
that can be appropriately performed by a supplemental workforce.  
This proposed approach is based on recognition that software sustainment is an 
engineering activity, a very different model from hardware sustainment. In many instances, 
software changes directly enable weapon system capabilities and/or overall system 
performance in support of maintaining national security. Therefore, there must be certain 
functions that are inherently governmental (i.e., required for the government to perform) to 
understand the technical baseline and then exercise technical authority to make appropriate 
engineering decisions. This implies the need for a model describing the engineering 
functions, capabilities, and competencies needed to perform sustainment and continually 
refresh the software technical baseline.  
As an initial model, Figure 4 depicts one view of key weapons systems depot-level 
software sustainment functions, which the SEI study team developed. The software 
engineering functions in the center of Figure 4 represent the basic processes that create 
software. These activities are based on current software engineering standards, which were 
derived from ISO/IEC 2167a. The functions on the perimeter of Figure 4 represent activities 
related to the ecosystem elements and other functions the SEI team identified during Phase 
I and Phase II activities and site visits of DoD maintenance facilities.  
Not all the functions depicted in this model are performed by every software 
sustainment organization. These functions can be decomposed and analyzed to identify 
associated technical task requirements. These requirements can then be analyzed to 
determine the competencies (skills, knowledge, and experience) necessary to execute those 
tasks. Following this logic leads to defining a baseline set functions, tasks, and 
competencies.  
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Figure 4. Weapons Systems Depot-Level Software Sustainment Functions 
Applying this function-based model requires knowledge and understanding of the 
technical baseline of the specific system. Each function can be decomposed into a more 
detailed description of the work content involved, and specific and relevant work flows, 
processes, and practice. These functions and the details of each function may vary in scope 
and degree depending on specific functionality and system domains.  
It is important to understand that a critical consideration in applying this model is 
identifying which software-sustainment functions are most critical from a national security 
perspective. Since software engineering functions involve changing the software baseline, a 
working knowledge and capability to perform these functions is probably high on the list of 
functions to staff organically.  
The activities on the left side of Figure 4 represent system and technology influences 
on the operational software baseline. For weapon systems that experience a frequent rate of 
change driven by threats and technology imperatives, the DoD may elect to employ an 
organic workforce to ensure overall weapon system readiness. For systems that have stable 
interfaces and infrequent refresh cycles, the DoD may elect to employ a mix of organic and 
contracted staff based on best value considerations. In these situations, the government will 
likely want to establish a minimal set of competencies in these functions so it can maintain 
technical authority in making decisions and provide some level of organic software 
sustainment to mitigate changes in the software sustainment supply chain.  
Another critical consideration in applying this model relates to addressing 
engineered-in-security, mitigating vulnerabilities via rapid deployment of security patches, 
and accommodation of the rapid pace of technological change. During our study, we 
observed that the DoD’s software-sustainment community is acutely aware of the need to 
enhance software workforce competencies for software assurance.  
For each function, careful attention must be paid to ensuring that the capabilities that 
are inherently governmental functions are maintained in the organic workforce and 
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understanding which ones are candidates to be outsourced to a supplemental workforce. 
The inherently governmental functions then must be managed accordingly. The requisite 
education, skills, domain knowledge and system experience must be documented, and a 
deliberate process to hire, train, retain, and grow organic personnel must be put in place. 
This approach ensures that the government is always capable of (1) understanding the 
technical baseline for the system and (2) making appropriate, long-term decisions about 
engineering alternatives. 
A key factor is applying this model is judging the appropriate DoD program official 
regarding the choice of using organic government software engineering capabilities, relying 
on defense industrial base capabilities, or selecting some mix of these capabilities to 
execute the sustainment mission. These choices are driven by a number of considerations, 
such as national security, affordability, and what the DoD believes is in its best interest in 
the long term.  
Summary 
A key takeaway message is that software sustainment is an engineering task. Almost 
any non-trivial change to the software requires analyzing the change and the current 
system, tracing the impact of the change on the existing requirements and design, and 
developing a new solution. For these reasons and others, policies and practices that are 
based on hardware sustainment, which can be treated as a discrete series of activities 
intended to restore form, fit, and function, do not apply well to software nor to understanding 
the requirements for the software workforce. 
Executing the DoD software engineering sustainment mission demands a keen focus 
on defining and continually refreshing the DoD’s software-engineering competencies to drive 
workforce development and organization performance.  
In this paper, we highlighted an initial functional model for thinking about software 
engineering competencies. We recognize that defining these competencies is a complex 
task that is a continuous activity that must be aligned with the nature and pace of technology 
change. Defining these competencies nests within the total workforce acquisition, 
development, and management strategy and plan.  
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